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CORPORATE REPS IN DEPS: TO EXCLUDE OR
NOT TO EXCLUDE
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose an employee of a corporation initiates a lawsuit for sexual
harassment.1 Prior to trial, attorneys from both sides depose all fact witnesses
and parties. These depositions elicit the events in question, as well as the
employee’s reputation and personal history. During the deposition
proceedings, the defendant-corporation’s representative attends all
proceedings on the corporation’s behalf.2 Consequently, as a tactical move,
the corporation substitutes representatives throughout all of the deposition
proceedings, allowing the subsequent corporate deponent to hear the
plaintiff’s testimony and craft his account prior to his own deposition. For
instance, the plaintiff’s supervisor, or the alleged harasser, may observe the
plaintiff’s factual testimony before his own deposition. This tactic creates an
advantage in primarily factual actions because the representative, in this case
the alleged harasser, easily crafts testimony to rebut the plaintiff’s account.
Then, continuing the strategic course of events, a new representative
attends the subsequent deposition proceeding involving a new plaintiff fact
witness. This problematic situation arises particularly when the
corresponding representative is deposed immediately following the plaintiff
witness, eliminating any opportunity to access written transcripts of previous
testimony.3 Even in the event of accessible transcripts, the presence of such
representatives may still impact the plaintiff’s ability to testify fully and
accurately.4
Prior to 1993, controversy surrounded the regulation and governance of
1. The cause of action could be a number of issues against an entity. For example, a worker
brings suit against an employer, a corporation, or other entity, for sexual harassment, age
discrimination, or workers compensation, among other claims.
2. See infra notes 29, 30, 141 (addressing whether corporate representatives are still permitted
to participate as a right in deposition proceedings following amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (FRCP)).
3. Even assuming that an opportunity exists to access previous deposition transcripts, courts
may in fact seal deposition proceedings and ban certain communications between attorney and
deponents until trial. However, courts have been reluctant and generally unwilling to seal prior
testimony and prohibit such communications. For a discussion of the courts’ treatment of sealing
deposition transcripts, see infra notes 144, 161 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 47-57, 88-91, 132, 147, 161, 165 and accompanying text (addressing the
impact of intimidation and fear of deponents on full and effective testimony).
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depositions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) traditionally
governed depositions.5 However, uncertainty existed in the courts concerning
the nature of depositions as compared to trials.6 Consequently, some courts
applied the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) to deposition proceedings.7
Under FRE 615, the opposing party can exclude witnesses at trial simply
upon request.8 Yet the rule expressly permits properly designated corporate
representatives to avoid sequestration and attend proceedings, even if they
are fact witnesses.9 On the other hand, to conduct discovery “with no one
present except persons designated by the court,” FRCP 26 (c)(5) requires a
court order.10
Therefore, if a court exclusively applies FRCP 26(c)(5) to depositions, a
party objecting to specific corporate representatives must obtain a court order
for exclusion. In contrast, under FRE 615, a corporate representative has the
right to be present, but the opposing party may remove a particular
representative simply upon request.
Because of this conflict concerning the governance of deposition
proceedings, Congress amended FRCP 30(c) in 1993.11 The amendment
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (1992). For the current language of FRCP 26(c)(5), see infra note 10.
For information on applying FRCP to deposition proceedings, see also infra notes 6, 27.
6. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. In particular, confusion existed as to the nature and
classification of discovery proceedings. As a result, some courts applied Federal Rule of Evidence 615
(FRE) to deposition proceedings in addition to the FRCP. See infra notes 7, 27 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., FRE 615, which states the following:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that they cannot hear the
testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the order of its own motion. This rule does not
authorize exclusion of (1) a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party
which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its attorney, or (3) a person whose
presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause, or (4) a person
authorized by statute to be present.
FED. R. EVID. 615.
8. See supra note 7. FRE 615 indicates that the court “shall order” a witness excluded “[a]t the
request of a party.” FED. R. EVID. 615 (emphasis added).
9. See supra note 7. Pursuant to FRE 615(2), designated corporate representatives, even if fact
witnesses to the action, can avoid sequestration from the simple “request of a party.” FED. R. EVID.
615. If the corporation’s representatives are not properly designated, then any party may exclude them
without court intervention. See id.
10. After a history of revisions and amendments, FRCP 26(c)(5) presently states as follows:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought,
accompanied by a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action, and for good
cause shown, the court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a
deposition, the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense, including one or more of the following: . . . (5) that discovery be conducted
with no one present except persons designated by the court . . . .
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(5).
11. Following its amendment in 1993, FRCP 30(c), in pertinent part, now reads:
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expressly states that depositions are to be conducted as permitted at trial
under the FRCP, except as under FRE 103 and 615.12 As a result, objections
to persons attending depositions are governed by FRCP 26(c)(5), thus
requiring a court order for exclusion of witnesses during deposition
proceedings. The Advisory Committee Notes to amended FRCP 30(c)
indicate an intent to clarify the governing procedural rules for witnesses in
depositions, but the Notes fail to clarify the substantive rule for when
potential deponents and witnesses may attend. Further, the courts prior to
1993 indicated a general trend towards exclusion.13 However, since 1993,
courts have favored the nonexclusion of potential fact witnesses from
depositions.14 Therefore, the issue remains whether or not corporate
representatives, while serving as potential fact witnesses, may attend the
depositions of other fact witnesses.
This Note proposes an amendment to FRCP 26(c) that would clarify the
corporate representative dilemma and give guidance to courts in its
application. The proposed amendment also provides an additional ground for
a protective order, which ensures integrity in pretrial depositions. In addition,
a detailed advisory committee note setting forth the purpose of the
amendment and its intended application would emphasize to courts the
proper “good cause” standard of review expressed in FRCP 26(c). This
amendment and advisory note would protect the interests of parties involved
in the dispute as well as preserve the vital corporate representative power in
judicial proceedings.
Part II of this Note establishes the framework and provides a foundation
for the problem presented by corporate representatives in depositions. Next,
(c) Examination and Cross-Examination; Record of Examination; Oath; Objections.
Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the
provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence except Rules 103 and 615. . . . All objections made at
the time of the examination to the qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, to the manner
of taking it, to the evidence presented, to the conduct of any party, or to any other aspect of the
proceedings shall be noted by the officer upon the record of the deposition; but the examination
shall proceed, with the testimony being taken subject to the objections.
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c).
12. See supra note 11. For the language of FRE 615, see supra note 7. See also FED. R. EVID.
103. FRE 103 prescribes the manner for making and ruling on objections at trial. This rule provides
that objections must be timely and they must state the specific grounds upon which a party has made
an objection. The rule also states that proceedings shall be conducted so as to prevent inadmissible
evidence from being suggested to juries. Lastly, FRE 103 affords for notice of plain errors affecting
substantial rights even if not brought to the attention of the court. FED. R. EVID. 103.
13. See infra notes 23, 36-57 and accompanying text (citing general trend in favor of exclusion
of potential fact witnesses prior to 1993).
14. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (citing general trend in favor of nonexclusion of
potential fact witnesses following the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c)).
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Part III traces the historical development of FRCP 26 and 30 as well as the
courts’ treatment of discovery governance, giving rise to the present
dilemma. Part IV then analyzes the current problem, and Part V presents the
proposal.
II. HISTORY
A. Purpose of Depositions
Depositions and pretrial discovery have become critical components of
judicial proceedings. The Supreme Court recognized that deposition
discovery pursuant to the FRCP is one of the most significant innovations in
the adversary process.15 In contemporary practice, a civil trial without
depositions is the exception.16 Deposition testimony directly impacts judicial
proceedings by its use at trial for impeachment or in place of live
testimony.17 Further, the rise in summary judgment adjudication increases the
importance of deposition proceedings in order to establish facts that could
dispose of the case without a formal trial.18
The Supreme Court has established the purposes and policies behind
pretrial discovery and depositions.19 The Court stated that instruments of
discovery, such as depositions, serve to “narrow and clarify the basic issues
between the parties,” as well as provide a device to obtain the existence of
15. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500 (1947). In Hickman, discovery issues arose in the
course of a lawsuit for the death of an employee while he was working on a tugboat. The Supreme
Court recognized the importance of pretrial proceedings to the litigation process. See id. The Court
stated that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation . . . . [and] [t]he deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage at which
disclosure can be compelled . . . thus reducing the possibility of surprise.” Id. at 507.
16. Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 96-1730, 1997 WL 567923, at *2 n.2 (D. Colo. Aug.
18, 1997).
17. Id.
18. Id. See also Havens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 94-1402, 1995 W.L. 234710, at *12
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1995) (stating that inherent pressures of litigation expedite discovery process and
reduce cost of litigation); In re Arbitration Between Intercarbon Beruda, Ltd. and Caltex Trading and
Transport Corp., 146 F.R.D.  64, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (stating that FRCP is construed to secure just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination without compromising goal of procedural efficiency);
Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 FRD 86, 91-92 (D.N.J. 1986) (requiring resources for long and
expensive investigations and discovery would be ludicrous and instead court ordered to facilitate the
expediant production of documents and discovery to streamline litigation); La. Educ. Assoc. v.
Richland Parish Sch. Bd., 421 F. Supp. 973, 976-77 (stating that heavier burden protects parties in
compliance; otherwise no deterrent to frivolous pleading, and respondent would face burdensome and
repetitous allegations).
19. See United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (indicating that
modern discovery instruments and pretrial procedures make trial less of a game and more of a fair
contest with basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest extent practicable); see also Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. at 501.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/6
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facts or information relative to those issues.20
Besides narrowing the pertinent issues and ascertaining relevant facts, this
pretrial procedure reduces the possibility of surprise by allowing parties to
obtain the most knowledge of the facts and issues before a formal trial.21 In
addition, depositions allow parties to obtain information for cross-
examination and the impeachment of witnesses.22 As set out above, the
purposes and policies behind discovery assign depositions a critical role in
judicial proceedings.
B. Governance of Depositions Before 1993
Prior to 1993, FRE 615 and FRCP 26 and 30 governed deposition
proceedings. Federal courts varied in the application of these rules, thereby
producing divergent outcomes. This section traces the applicable federal
rules and the federal courts’ interpretation of these rules leading up to the
amendment of FRCP 30(c) in 1993.
1. Federal Rules
The history surrounding the governance of depositions prior to 1993
reveals an expansion of judicial discretion and control.23 Following
20. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 501. Prior to Hickman, under federal practice, parties employed
pleadings to give facts and formulate the issues. This method was cumbersome and narrowly confined.
Yet in today’s practice, pleadings serve to give notice and invest the deposition-discovery process with
a vital role in preparation for trial. Id.
21. Id. In addition, the Hickman Court stated: “Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer
need to be carried on in the dark.” Id. But see, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective
Order Litigation, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1983) (stating that the current “boom” in federal civil
litigation and the attendant developments in discovery threaten to undermine the central goal of the
FRCP articulated in Rule 1, namely, “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action”).
22. See United States v. Int’l Business Machines Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2041 (2d ed. 1994); 10 FED. PROC. LAW. ED. § 26:217 (1994).
23. Prior to 1970, the corresponding provision to FRCP 26(c)(5) was FRCP 30(b) which stated
“that the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action and their
officers or counsel.” WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041; see also 4 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 26.25 n.4 (2d ed. 1996). Courts read this provision literally to mean that the
parties, their officers, and counsel could not be excluded from discovery proceedings. WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 22, § 2041. In 1970, an amendment to FRCP 30(b) transferred the protective order
provisions from FRCP 30 to FRCP 26, but did not intend to change the substantive impact of the rule.
See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035. The transfer was initiated as a result of the
recognition that depositions were more frequent and thus tactical problems associated with discovery
began to arise. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s notes. See also Arthur R. Miller,
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 450
(1991) (categorizing the 1970 amendments as reflecting and encouraging a view of pretrial as an
Washington University Open Scholarship
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amendments to the FRCP in 1970, courts exercised complete discretion as to
the presence of parties and the procedures during depositions.24 Yet
controversy existed among the courts as to the scope of the FRCP and the
application of FRE 615.25 Until 1993, FRCP 30(c) stated that “[e]xamination
and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial
under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”26 This language
caused courts to vary in their interpretations of procedural review when
considering the exclusion of persons from depositions.27
Pursuant to this language in pre-1993 FRCP 30(c), FRE 615 presented the
greatest problem for courts in governing depositions. Rule 615 states that
“[a]t the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.”28 However, Rule 615 did
not authorize exclusion of “an officer or employee of a party which is not a
natural person designated as its representative by its attorney.”29 According
“integrated process subject to overreaching control by the trial court”).
In 1970, Congress also amended FRCP 26(c) to include the phrase “discovery be conducted with
no one present except persons designated by the court.” Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d. Cir.
1973) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)). These revisions enlarged the courts’ discretion and control in
governing deposition procedures. See id. at 997 (holding that this enlarged authority made it clear that
the court had power to exclude even a party from proceedings under appropriate circumstances); see
also 23 AM. JUR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 103 (1983); Miller, supra at 451 (stating that the
1970 amendments sought to “encourage more frequent imposition of sanctions” for abuse and to
strengthen judges’ power to sanction discovery proceedings) (quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22,
§ 2281, at 39 (Supp. 1991)).
24. See Galella, 487 F.2d at 997 (stating that the 1970 revisions enlarged the courts’ discretion
and authority to exclude a party from proceedings). See also AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23, § 103, at 437
(interpreting various cases to the exclusion of a party from discovery when necessary to protect the
deponent from embarrassment or ridicule, to ensure independent testimony from successive deponents,
to control disclosure of competitive information, or in other situations in need of privacy). See
generally supra note 23 (discussing enlarged authority of courts).
25. See infra note 27 (pertaining to the courts’ confusion as to the application and interplay of
FRE 615 and FRCP 26(c) with regard to depositions). This confusion led to Congress’s enactment of
the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c), which finally resolved the conflict among courts. See generally
8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2113 (2d ed. 1994).
26. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (1992). See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113 (stating that
FRCP 30(c) directs that depositions should proceed as at trial in order to allow leading questions of
adverse witnesses and greater scope on cross-examination).
27. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987) (applying FRE 615 to
deposition proceedings); Naismith v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (same);
Williams v. Elec. Control Sys., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 703 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (same). But cf. Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991)
(same); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (same),
aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1993); Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112
F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986) (same); Skidmore v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 90 F.R.D. 75 (S.D. Fla. 1981)
(applying FRCP 26 to deposition proceedings).
28. FED. R. EVID. 615. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (reciting provisions under FRE
615 upon which a court shall exclude witnesses from proceedings).
29. FED. R. EVID. 615. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text (reciting exceptions to FRE
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/6
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to FRE 615, a corporate representative, designated as such by the
corporation’s attorney, cannot be excluded from trial at the mere request of a
party.30 Construing FRCP 30(c) along with FRE 615, corporate
representatives then could not be excluded from depositions by the mere
request of a party.31
FRCP 26(c)(5), however, also regulated the attendance of persons at
deposition proceedings.32 The procedural difference in following FRCP 26,
as opposed to FRE 615, reveals that the FRCP approach requires a court
order based upon a “showing of good cause” to exclude witnesses during
discovery proceedings.33 As a result, some courts refused to apply FRE 615
to depositions and thereby required a court order for the exclusion of
615 for the exclusion of witnesses). Also included as exceptions to exclusion at the request of a party
under FRE 615 are “(1) a party who is a natural person, . . . or (3) a person whose presence is shown
by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s cause.” FED. R. EVID. 615.
30. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041, at 535-36 (regarding exclusion of witnesses, “it is
now clear that [FRE] 615 does not warrant automatically excluding witnesses from depositions”). See
also 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, Sequestration of Witnesses § 1841 (rev.
1976) (noting that neither the party demanding nor the party against whom the demand was made may
insist on sequestration or inclusion as a matter of right). See, e.g., supra note 27 and infra notes 36-65
(highlighting case law and exceptions to the FRE 615 general rule of exclusion).
31. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113 (Supp. 1999) (stating that the 1993 amendment
“resolves a conflict in the cases about whether a protective order is necessary to exclude witnesses [in
particular corporate representatives] by declaring that a motion under [FRCP] 26(c)(5) is essential”).
See also FED. PROC. LAW. ED., supra note 22, § 26:217 (commenting that court determinations of
witness exclusions have been simplified by the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c) because other
witnesses are not automatically excluded from depositions simply by the request of a party). For an
analysis of pre-1993 amendment cases, see supra note 27; infra notes 36-65.
However, a corporation must provide designated representatives who are competent to testify. See
AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23, § 145. These designated representatives may be “officers, directors,
managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on [the organization’s] behalf.” Id. The
persons designated must testify as to matters known or reasonably available to the organization. Id. As
a result, in situations like the hypothetical posed in the introduction to this Note, an employee’s
supervisor or manager charged in the complaint is designated as the corporation’s representative and
thereby permitted to attend all discovery proceedings absent a protective order. See also Nutmeg Ins.
Co. v. Atwell, Vogel & Sterling, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 504, 508 (W.D. La. 1988) (holding that, in
accordance with FRCP 30(b)(6), designated corporate representatives shall testify as to matters known
or reasonably available to the organization).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(5) (1992) (regulating attendance of persons at deposition
proceedings upon showing of good cause).
33. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (reciting the standard under FRCP 26(c) for issuing
protective orders). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041 n.3 (indicating that “there certainly
are factors supporting the unfettered right of a party to attend trial that need not apply to attendance at
a pretrial deposition”). But see id., supra note 22, § 2035, at 478 (stating that courts consider the
timeliness of the motion and examine all of the circumstances). Consequently, in order to establish
good cause, “courts have insisted on particular and specific demonstrations of fact, as distinguished
from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Id. See also infra notes 122-23 and accompanying text
(revealing the transformed standard from good cause to extraordinary and compelling demonstrations
of fact).
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parties.34 Courts applied the “good cause” standard only “rarely,” to protect a
“party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue
burden or expense.”35 This higher standard, which courts applied pursuant to
the FRCP, favored the inclusion of persons at deposition proceedings.
2. Judicial Application
Prior to 1993, federal courts required a “good cause” standard for
exclusion. Parties raised the good cause standard and various policy concerns
in motions for protective orders to exclude witnesses during discovery
proceedings. The courts applied these principles to the corporate
representative context.
a. Orders to Exclude Witnesses and Corporate Representatives
(i)  Standard for Exclusion
Prior to the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c), the courts exhibited a
general trend toward witness exclusion. In 1973, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit established the traditional standard for exclusion in Galella v.
Onassis, upholding a protective order during the taking of depositions.36 In
Galella, a false arrest and malicious prosecution case against President
Kennedy’s widow, the plaintiff had already violated a temporary restraining
order against the defendant.37 In order to protect the defendant from further
harassment, the court granted exclusion of the plaintiff from the defendant’s
deposition.38 Applying the “good cause” standard expressed in FRCP 26(c),39
34. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting the cases in which FRE 615 was not
applied to depositions, often resulting in the courts’ refusal to grant orders of exclusion due to the
higher burden and procedural requirements for exclusion).
35. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir. 1973). For a discussion of FRCP 26(c)(5),
amendments to the FRCP, and the current state of the FRCP, see infra notes 66-76 and accompanying
text. See, e.g., WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041 (discussing power to preclude parties from
proceedings exercised by courts in other extraordinary situations as well); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 22, § 2036 (“[FRCP] 26(c) was adopted as a safeguard for the protection of parties and
witnesses in view of the almost unlimited right of discovery given by [FRCP] 26(b)(1).”); MOORE ET
AL., supra note 23, ¶ 26.19 (reading FRCP to contemplate broad discovery with courts’ exercising
wide discretion to implement full disclosure of relevant information, and “at the same time afford the
participants the maximum protection against harmful side effects”).
36. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). See also WIGMORE, supra note 30,
§ 1838, at 463 (“The expedient of sequestration is one of the greatest engines that the skill of man has
ever invented for the detection of liars in a court of justice.”); see also Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30
F.R.D. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (extending rationale from WIGMORE, supra, to pretrial proceedings
due to the discovery of relevant facts and information).
37. Galella, 485 F.2d at 991.
38. See id. at 997. This trend in favor of exclusion applied in the corporate representative context
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the court reasoned that the power to exclude a party rested in the courts, but
should be ordered rarely.40
as well. Compare Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987) with Naismith v. Prof’l
Golfers Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979). The Naismith court held that corporate representatives
could not be excluded from depositions. However, it achieved the same result by sealing the deposition
transcripts, precluding their review by the defendant witnesses. 85 F.R.D. at 568. In Lumpkin, the court
extended the decision in Naismith by applying FRE 615 to depositions. 117 F.R.D. at 453. The court
upheld a protective order by limiting the number of defendant witnesses representing the corporation
at the plaintiff’s deposition. Id. at 454.
For further discussion regarding the Naismith court’s action in sealing the transcripts, see WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113, at 92 n.10. “[I]f exclusion is ordered, consideration should not be given
as to whether the excluded witness likewise should be precluded from reading or being otherwise
informed about, the testimony given in earlier depositions.” Id. (quoting FED. R. EVID. 615 advisory
committee’s note). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113, at 92 (“‘[I]f exclusion is ordered,
consideration should be given as to whether the excluded witness likewise should be precluded from
reading, or being otherwise informed about, the testimony given in earlier depositions.’”) (quoting the
advisory committee’s notes to FRE 615); 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE, Witnesses ¶ 615[01], at 615-8 (1996) ([T]he harm [FRE 615] was designed to
prevent was the shaping of testimony by one witness to conform with that of another and that the
opportunity to do so was as great when a witness was allowed to read trial testimony [the same as if
heard in open court.]”).
In Lumpkin, the court extended the Naismith holding to include the court’s discretion in limiting
the presence of representatives. See 117 F.R.D. at 453. Despite the expressed exception in FRE 615,
the court stated that the judiciary’s wide discretion determines the number of corporate representatives
in attendance. See id. at 454. See also WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra, ¶ 615[02], at 615-12. This treatise
indicates that “[i]t is not clear from the test [sic] or legislative history of [FRE 615] whether more than
one representative may be designated.” Id. In most large organizations, it would be impossible to find
one person with sufficient knowledge and information needed to assist the attorney. Further,
“[u]nnecessary exclusions of one of a number of representatives may slow down the trial by requiring
continuances so an attorney can consult with persons outside the courtroom.” Id. Therefore, judges
must have wide and flexible discretion to allow multiple representatives. Id. However, the Lumpkin
court only permitted one corporate representative to attend the plaintiff’s deposition. See 117 F.R.D. at
454. Cf. Marks v. Powell (In re Marks), 135 B.R. 344, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1991) (allowing
attendance of only one corporate representative at deposition proceedings based on the purpose and
rationale behind FRE 615, which permits one litigation representative per party).
39. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136
F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); Clark v. Levine (In re Levine), 101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989);
Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom
Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th
Cir. 1993); Naismith v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n., 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Beacon v. R.M. Jones
Apartment Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
40. See Galella, 487 F.2d at 997. For a discussion of the courts’ power to exclude persons from
depositions based on the relevant history and amendments to the FRCP, see supra notes 7, 10, 11, 23-
35 and accompanying text. Cf. Naismith, 85 F.R.D. at 567. In Naismith, a Georgia district court held
that the rule of sequestration does not apply to corporate representatives in depositions due to the
exception enumerated in FRE 615. Id. at 567. Although the court applied FRE 615 to depositions, it
ruled that sequestration was not guaranteed between depositions and trial. Id. As a result, the court
sealed the deposition transcripts under FRCP 26(c) to ensure that the defendants’ credibility and
individual testimonies would not be altered or corroborated in a gender discrimination suit. Id. at 568.
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 (ii) Basis for Exclusion
In In re Levine, a Colorado court granted a protective order sequestering
party deponents related to a trust action alleging fraud and conspiracy.41 In so
doing, the court enumerated the traditional concerns supporting exclusion.42
With respect to discovery, the court recognized its authority to exclude
witnesses at depositions, but predicated its use on strong and compelling
reasons.43 Due to the risk that the deponents’ testimony may be influenced,
even unintentionally, if allowed to attend other witnesses’ depositions, the
court entitled the trustee to each witness’s “independent, uninfluenced
recollection of events, transactions and communications.”44 The court
refused to allow FRE 615 to circumvent the restrictions under FRCP 26(c),
especially where good cause exists for sequestration.45 In addition, the court
reasoned that based on their respective counsels’ attendance at the other
depositions, each deponent received full and effective representation at such
discovery proceedings.46
41. See In re Levine, 101 B.R. at 261.
42. For a listing of the traditional concerns supporting exclusion, see supra note 24.
43. Id. at 262 (citing BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlantacom Sys., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala.
1986)). For a discussion of the BCI Communication Systems decision, see infra notes 64-65 and
accompanying text. Cf. infra notes 79-99, 122-23 and accompanying text (applying an extraordinary
and compelling standard).
44. In re Levine, 101 B.R. at 263. See also Dunlap, 30 F.R.D. at 131.
[S]equestration will deny to the dishonest witness the advantage of observing the experience of
other witnesses as they give their testimony on direct examination and are confronted with
contradictions or evasions under cross-examination. At the least, it will make available the raw
reactions’ and the individual recollection of each witness unaided by the stimulation of the
evidence of any other witness.
Id. See generally WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041 (considering the 1993 amendment to FRCP
and stating that courts need to make decisions regarding depositions based on factors in Dunlap and
not authorize automatic exclusion like at trial).
45. 101 B.R. at 262. See, e.g., Dunlap, 30 F.R.D. at 131 (holding that camaraderie of employees
who work together constituted “good cause” for separation in pretrial exam when testifying against
their employer regarding damage claim). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041. Courts have
found “good cause” sufficient to require exclusion for matters involving confidential material and
when one party can examine witnesses more effectively if others are not present. Id. The subtle and
elusive components of memory can result in forgetfulness that is not associated with dishonesty or
untruthfulness. Dunlap, 30 F.R.D. at 131-32. This argument would support the inclusion of parties in
order to trigger recollections of past events. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041.
46. See In re Levine, 101 B.R. at 262. See also Solar Turbines, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct.
551, 553 (1988) (“[O]ur system of justice generally relie[d] upon . . . basic honesty . . . , harsh
sanctions for perjury, and a panoply of rights concerning discovery and cross-examination to assure
. . . truth is revealed in the courtroom.”).
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 (iii) Corporate Representative Context
A Louisiana federal court decided a classic corporate representative
situation in In re Shell Oil Refinery.47 In this case, employees sued their
corporate employer in a class action following injuries sustained from an
explosion on the job.48 Realizing that each deponent’s supervisor was to
serve as the representative during that employee’s deposition, the employees
moved to exclude the designated corporate representatives from the
plaintiffs’ depositions.49 The plaintiffs claimed that the supervisory authority
of these varying representatives and their status as witnesses intimidated the
deponents, thereby influencing their testimony.50 The technical subject matter
entitled the corporation to have knowledgeable representatives present to
assist counsel in the deposition.51
Initially, the court allowed the corporate representatives to attend the
depositions based on the defendants’ right to defend themselves at all stages
of litigation.52 However, the court later held that this right is not
unqualified.53 As a result, the court precluded the defendant-corporation from
designating representatives with supervisory authority over the plaintiff-
deponents as well as potential fact witnesses.54 By reading FRCP 26(c)(5)
and FRE 615 together, the court found good cause to exclude the defendant-
corporation’s representatives based on a risk that, if allowed to attend, both
the defendant-corporations’ witnesses and the plaintiffs’ witnesses might not
testify as fully as they otherwise would if the court prohibited their
attendance.55 This risk included intimidation of the plaintiffs and altered
47. Adams v. Shell Oil Co. (In re Shell Oil Refinery), 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991). For a
further analysis regarding the trend favoring exclusion applied in the corporate representative context,
see supra note 38.
48. In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. at 615. This class action suit arose from an explosion in
the catalytic cracking unit at a Shell Oil Refinery facility in Louisiana. The designated corporate
representatives with technical experience were supervisors on the unit. One problem was that few
survived the explosion and others were physically incapable of testifying, thus limiting the number of
possible witnesses from the refinery. Id. at 615-16.
49. Id. at 615.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 615-16.
52. Id. at 616. During a telephone conference, the court overruled the plaintiffs’ first objection to
the presence of one of the defendant’s representatives. Id.
53. Id. The court found the right to defend at all stages of litigation unqualified based on its joint
reading of FRE 615 and FRCP 26(c)(5). The court reasoned that FRE 615 applied to depositions
through FRCP 30(c). A corporate representative could, therefore, only be excluded from a deposition
proceeding upon a showing of good cause. Id. at 617.
54. In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. at 617.
55. Id.
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testimony by the defendants.56 Consequently, the court did not preclude the
defendant from having a corporate representative present, but that
representative had to satisfy express restrictions.57
b. Denial of Protective Orders to Exclude Witnesses and Corporate
Representatives
Although the courts generally favored exclusion of potential fact
witnesses from deposition proceedings, a few courts denied protective orders
during discovery.58 In Skidmore v. Northwest Engineering Co., a Florida
court denied a protective order excluding the plaintiff’s expert witness from
the deposition of one of the defendant’s employees.59 The defendant claimed
that permitting such attendance would result in a “circus atmosphere”
unfairly prejudicing the defendant because the expert had yet to form an
opinion.60 The court held that the party opposing an expert’s presence at a
deposition must show good cause for exclusion.61 As a result, the Skidmore
court determined that FRCP 26(c)(5) governed depositions instead of FRE
615.62 Moreover, the court concluded that the policy reasons underlying the
56. Id. See also Beacon v. R. M. Jones Apartment Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141, 142 (N.D. Ohio 1978)
(excluding parties to the suit because questions of credibility, inherent in Title VII cases, permitted the
greatest opportunity for testimony evaluation when the court secluded witnesses). See, e.g., WIGMORE,
supra note 30, § 1837 (noting the historical “expedient of separating a party’s witnesses in order to
detect falsehoods by exposing inconsistencies”). See also supra notes 19, 46-55 (discussing interest in
generating truthful and effective testimonial examinations).
57. See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. at 617-18. The Shell court held that the defendant
could designate other representatives who were not supervisors or potential fact witnesses. To balance
the interests of both parties, the court allowed supervisors assisting with technical aspects of the case
to sit outside the deposition room and consult with attorneys during breaks. Id. at 617. The court
further permitted excluded representatives to read daily transcripts during evening recesses and
allowed the defendant’s attorneys to follow-up in questioning the next day based on consultations with
the excluded representatives. Id. at 618.
58. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986); United Incentives
v. Sea Gull Lighting Prod., Inc., No 91-0226, 1991 WL 209018 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1991); BCI Comm.
Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm.
v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999); Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986);
Skidmore v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 90 F.R.D. 75 (S.D. Fla. 1981); Williams v. Elec. Control Sys., Inc.,
68 F.R.D. 703 (E.D. Tenn. 1975).
59. See Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. at 77.
60. But cf. WIGMORE, supra note 30; infra notes 61-65 (citing the policy behind exclusion of
experts from deposition proceedings).
61. Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. at 76. See also Kerschbaumer, 112 F.R.D. at 427 (stating that the court
will grant protective orders only to prevent harassment, coercion of witnesses, and dissemination of
trade secrets). Although some courts allow protective orders to ensure independent recollection
without influence from other witnesses, the Kerschbaumer court implied that it would only invoke
orders sparingly to preserve openness and procedural fairness of the legal system. See id. (citing
Beacon, 79 F.R.D. at 142). See also infra notes 76, 115-18 and accompanying text.
62. Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. at 76. But see Williams, 68 F.R.D. at 703. In 1975, the Tennessee
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sequestration rule, preventing one witness from conforming his testimony to
that of another deponent, were not applicable to expert testimony.63 During
depositions, good cause permits exclusion in limited circumstances64 to
protect a party from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense.65
district court in Williams applied FRE 615 to the taking of depositions. Id. In so doing, the court
permitted the presence of the plaintiff’s expert witness during the depositions to allow him to assist the
deposing attorney. Id. at 704. Despite the defendant’s objection in Williams, the court reversed an
order sequestering the witness because the expert fulfilled one of the three exceptions to the exclusion
rule. Id. at 703. However, the Williams court did, in fact, acknowledge the authority of courts and
litigators to exclude witnesses from depositions. Id. at 703-04.
In Skidmore, the court required a showing of good cause to exclude the plaintiffs’ witnesses
pursuant to procedural rules, not evidentiary rules. Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. at 76. Nevertheless, both
courts acknowledged the application of the exclusionary rule to deposition proceedings and denied the
issuance of protective orders. See generally Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121 (stating that exclusionary
authority exists pursuant to FRCP 26(c) when movant demonstrates good cause through specific
examples or articulated reasoning involving significant harm); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38,
¶ 615[02], at 615-12 (discussing the presence of multiple corporate representatives at deposition
proceedings).
63. Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. at 76. But see Queen v. Wa. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 842 F.2d 476,
481 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that sequestration was designed to prevent “the possibility of one witness
shaping his testimony to match that given by other witnesses”); WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 1837
(stating that the less a witness hears of another’s testimony, the more likely the witness is to declare his
or her own knowledge simply and unbiased); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 615[01], at 615-
05 (detailing policy reasons in support of exclusion, such as preventing one witness from altering or
conforming testimony to another, and ensuring that experts testify according to their opinions and not
controverting facts); supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala.
1986)., aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999). In BCI, an Alabama
court denied protective orders during depositions. Id. at 160. The court held that the defendants did not
meet their burden of demonstrating good cause to exclude potential witnesses in civil depositions. Id.
Although concluding that sequestration is not a right, the court recognized the ability to exclude
deponents upon obtaining a court order with proof of good cause. Id. at 157-58. The BCI court refused
to grant a protective order based on ordinary “garden variety or boilerplate ‘good cause’ facts,” which
did not rise to the level of compelling or exceptional circumstances. Id. at 160.
See also United Incentives, Inc. v. Sea Gull Lighting Prod., Inc., No. 91-0226, 1991 WL 209018,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 1991) (holding that “[a]n inchoate fear of influence upon deposition testimony
does not establish good cause”). For a discussion in support of the compelling or exceptional
circumstances threshold for issuance of protective orders, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
But see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); infra note 123 and accompanying text (establishing the requisite
standard for a protective order as particular and specific demonstrations of fact constituting “good
cause,” as opposed to compelling or exceptional circumstances).
65. Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. at 76 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(5)). The Skidmore court also noted
that even if FRE 615 applied exclusively, the rule exempts certain witnesses from exclusion. Id. When
an expert’s presence is essential to the presentation of the cause, attendance is permitted. See id. See
also BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154, aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm.
v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999).
In BCI, the court noted that FRCP 30(c) clearly applies the FRE to depositions, but FRE 615 does
not apply because it is trumped by FRCP 26(c). Id. at 158. The court also concluded that FRE 615 did
not apply between deposition and trial, thereby providing no authority for sealing deposition testimony
before trial. Id. at 159. The court denied the defendants’ the motion for a protective order because they
failed to show sufficient good cause, required under FRCP 26(c). Id. at 159-60. For a discussion of the
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C. The 1993 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(c)
As a result of the conflict among the courts regarding the application of
the FRE and FRCP to deposition proceedings, Congress amended FRCP
30(c) in 1993. According to the advisory committee, the 1993 amendment
addressed the recurring problem of whether potential deponents could attend
deposition proceedings.66 By applying FRE 615, courts allowed parties to
exclude witnesses simply by request.67 Yet other courts permitted attendance
of witnesses pursuant to FRCP 26(c)(5) unless excluded by a protective order
under appropriate circumstances.68
To clarify this confusion, Congress amended FRCP 30(c). As a result, 
direct and cross-examinations in depositions proceeded as permitted at trial
under the FRE, the same as before the amendment. The significant textual
change in 1993, however, expressly excluded application of FRE 10369 and
61570 in deposition proceedings.71 Consequently, FRCP 26(c)(5) clearly
regulated the presence of parties and potential witnesses at depositions.72
Recognizing the conflict between FRE 615 and FRCP 26(c)(5), the
advisory committee specifically addressed this revision only as to the matter
application of FRE 615 to depositions as well as the courts’ reaction to sealing deposition transcripts
and records prior to trial, see supra notes 7, 27; infra notes 144, 161. See also FED. R. EVID. 615
advisory committee’s note (allowing attendance of experts when “needed to advise counsel in the
management of the litigation”); WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 38, ¶ 615[01]; WIGMORE, supra
note 30, § 1841. See, e.g., supra notes 36-57 and accompanying text (addressing the concerns
associated with “good cause” bases as protection during discovery proceedings).
66. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note. For a discussion of the history of FRCP
30(c) and its amendment, see supra notes 23-35 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); Naismith v. Prof’l
Golfers Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Williams, 68 F.R.D. 703 (E.D. Tenn. 1975) (applying
FRE 615 to deposition proceedings).
68. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136
F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D.
ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999); Kerschbaumer v.
Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986); Skidmore, 90 F.R.D. 75 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (applying FRCP 26 to
deposition proceedings). See also supra notes 6-11, 27 and accompanying text (recognizing the
disagreement as to the procedural governance of depositions).
69. FRE 103 prescribes the manner for making and ruling on objections at trial. For a brief
discussion of FRE 103, see supra note 12.
70. See supra note 7.
71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c), which currently states: “Examination and cross-examination of
witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
except Rules 103 and 615.” Id. (emphasis added).
72. See supra notes 66, 68, 70; infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text (recognizing discovery
exclusions only applicable through FRCP 26(c)(5)). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note) (stating that the 1993 amendment no longer
permits automatic exclusion under FRE 615 at depositions); FED. PROC. LAW. ED., supra note 22,
§ 26:217 (stating that the amendment simplified procedure and courts are now clear as to which rules
govern depositions).
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of attendance by potential deponents.73 According to the advisory committee,
the revision’s purpose provided “that other witnesses are not automatically
excluded simply by the request of a party.”74 Instead, the rule required courts
to order exclusion pursuant to FRCP 26(c)(5) when appropriate.75 The
committee further stated that the revision failed to address issues concerning
attendance by members of the public or press.76 The amendment, then,
simply clarified the procedure necessary to exclude potential witnesses from
deposition discovery.
D. Governance After the 1993 Amendment
After the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c), federal courts began
transforming the “good cause” standard into “extraordinary or compelling”
or “particular demonstrations of fact” standards.77 Moreover, courts refused
to consider the policy concerns that once supported protective orders.78 These
higher standards impacted the corporate representative context as well.
1. Judicial Denial of Protective Orders to Exclude
a. Standard for Exclusion
Following the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c), courts have favored the
denial of motions to exclude potential witnesses from depositions.79
Recently, Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc., illustrated this standard for
exclusion, denying a protective order in a race discrimination and harassment
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s notes.
74. Id.
75. Id. After ordering exclusion, a court may then consider whether to prohibit the excluded
witnesses from reading, or being otherwise informed about, the testimony given in earlier depositions.
Id. For a discussion of the reaction of courts to the sealing of deposition transcripts and discovery
communications, see infra notes 144, 161.
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note. But see A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and
Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273 (1998); Marcus, supra note 21, at 1; Miller, supra
note 23, at 427. These articles note that discovery is not a public process and the public does not have
a right to access such proceedings. Further, information obtained during discovery assists in trial
preparation, often on a confidential basis.
77. See, e.g., infra notes 82, 96, 104, 122 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,
185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Williams v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., No. 98-2931, 1999 WL 221119
(E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1999); Nyazie v. Kennedy, No. 97-0120, 1998 WL 398250 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998);
Lee v. Denver Sheriff’s Dep’t, 181 F.R.D. 651 (D. Colo. 1998); Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No.
96-K-1730, 1997 WL 567923 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 1997); Tuszkiewicz v. Allen Bradley Co., 170
F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wisc. 1996).
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suit against a former employer.80 The North Carolina district court stated that
the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c) clarified that deposition witnesses were
not “subject to sequestration as a matter of course.”81 Instead, the court
required particular and specific facts for a showing of good cause.82 Based on
the discriminatory nature of incidents leading to the complaint, the plaintiff
asserted that good cause existed.83 In addition, the potential factual witnesses
were co-workers and supervisors of the defendant-corporation who were
allegedly involved in collusion, misrepresentation, and discriminatory
conduct.84 The court, however, found these allegations to be “ordinary
garden variety or boilerplate ‘good cause’ facts which exist in most civil
litigation.”85 The court concluded that finding good cause in such an instance
would mandate the same result in all cases with more than one fact witness
and an allegation of prejudice.86 Consequently, the court denied the motion
80. Jones, 185 F.R.D. at 225.
81. Id. at 224. For a discussion of the 1993 amendment to FRCP 30(c), see supra notes 66-76
and accompanying text.
82. Jones, 185 F.R.D. at 224 (citing In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d at 306 (quoting United States v.
Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978)). See also Chrysler Fin. Corp., 1999 WL 221119, at
*1 (denying a protective order for a Title VII claim based on the broad and liberal scope of discovery
as well as the conclusory statements without particularized demonstrations of fact to support such an
order); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035; supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the
requisite burden for granting a protective order under FRCP 26(c)); infra notes 92-99 (analyzing In re
Terra International, Inc.).
83. Jones, 185 F.R.D. at 224.
84. Id. The plaintiff claimed that her employment was tolerable until the new zone manager was
appointed. Before the new manager, her performance reviews were “exceptional” and she consistently
received pay raises. After his arrival, the plaintiff never received a favorable review and was both
singled out for reprimands and unfairly supervised. In addition, the plaintiff’s supervisor was required
to “agree” to the incidents and misrepresent facts against her. The plaintiff’s supervisor even allegedly
fabricated an incident to place in the plaintiff’s file. As a result, the new zone manager held “great
influence over [the plaintiff’s supervisor].” Id.
85. Id. (quoting BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154, 160 (N.D.
Ala. 1986)). See Tuszkiewicz v. Allen Bradley Co., 170 F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wisc. 1996).
In Tuszkiewicz, a Wisconsin district court denied a motion for a protective order to prevent three
employees from attending each other’s depositions against their employer. Id. at 17. The court held
that the movant failed to show good cause by alleging a mere threat of prejudice. Id. The court stated
that simply alleging that a party will be harmed without an order is insufficient to establish good cause.
Id. at 16. A movant must offer distinct facts jeopardizing truthful or altered testimony. Id. at 17.
See also Nyazie, 1998 WL 398250, at *3 (finding that no extraordinary factors existed in a
wrongful death action based on a detailed analysis of the circumstances, parties, and issues involved,
and requiring a specific showing of good cause); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035 (stating that
courts insist on particular and specific demonstrations of fact as opposed to stereotyped and conclusory
allegations); infra note 123 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 36-57 and infra note 122 and
accompanying text.
86. Jones, 185 F.R.D. at 224-25. See also infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text (discussing
In re Terra International, Inc.); supra notes 36-57, 79-85 and infra notes 88-99, 122-24 (detailing the
appropriate standards and analysis for imposing a protective order).
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for a protective order.87
b. Basis for Exclusion
In Visor v. Sprint/United Management Co., a Colorado district court
challenged the traditional pre-1993 grounds for exclusion by setting aside a
protective order sequestering plaintiff-witnesses.88 The court stated that the
right to participate in the adjudicatory process is fundamental to our system
of justice.89 Based on that rationale, the court held that tactical considerations
of exclusion to secure independent recollections or to avoid the tailoring of
testimony were not per se compelling.90 The court refused to “restructure”
the process for counsel to “catch” witnesses in inconsistent statements.91
c. Corporate Representative Context
In a 1998 post-amendment hallmark case, In re Terra International, Inc.,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a protective order
sequestering potential deponents.92 Following an explosion at an ammonium
nitrate facility, the plaintiff-employees brought a product liability action
87. Jones, 185 F.R.D. at 225.
88. Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 96-K-1730, 1997 WL 567923,  at *4 (D. Colo. Aug.
18, 1997).
89. Id. at *2. The court further noted that “sequestration, like all forms of secrecy, is inimical” to
the principle of open courts. Id. See also Hines v. Wilkinson, 163 F.R.D. 262 (S.D. Ohio 1995)
(denying motion to exclude inmate from attending depositions). But see supra notes 61, 76 and infra
notes 115-17 (concerning the public’s access to depositions and discovery proceedings).
90. Visor, 1997 WL 567923, at *3. The purpose of pretrial depositions is to discover facts; the
competence and skill of counsel in cross-examination ensures accuracy and truthfulness. Id. But see
supra notes 46-57, 88-89 and infra notes 91, 132, 147, 161, 165 and accompanying text (emphasizing
the importance of truthful and independent recollections as the basis of testimony in trial and pretrial
proceedings).
91. Visor, 1997 WL 567923, at *3. See Lee v. Denver Sheriff’s Dep’t, 181 F.R.D. 651 (D. Colo.
1998).
In Lee, a Colorado district court denied a motion for a protective order during depositions. Id. at
653. However, Lee involved a highly factual claim of abuse. An inmate brought suit against a police
officer and deputy sheriff alleging that he was beaten while in jail. Id. at 651. Claiming a factual issue
of excessive force, the plaintiff attempted to exclude the defendants due to a “significant risk” that
such attendance may influence each defendant’s account of critical facts, thereby impeding an
independent, unbiased recollection of events occurring almost four years prior to the deposition. Id. at
652. The court concluded that this argument speculated as to what the defendants may testify. As a
result, the court found no basis for the defendants to “color or change” their testimony after hearing the
others’ accounts. Id. at 653. Further, the court noted that the defendants had four years to discuss their
testimonies. Id. The court held that this time frame and lack of proof failed to demonstrate any
extraordinary and exceptional circumstances to exclude defendants from depositions in which they
were named parties. Id. See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035; supra notes 33, 91 (discussing
timeliness and proof requirements under FRCP 26(c)).
92. In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 307 (5th Cir. 1998).
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against the designer of a faulty processing component.93 Without affidavits or
other evidence, the defendant claimed that employee solidarity or company
pressure might taint the plaintiff-employees’ testimony and preclude the
witnesses’ raw reactions.94 The district court, therefore, granted the
defendant’s protective order sequestering all fact witnesses prior to their
depositions. In addition, the court also limited the number of corporate
representatives over the course of depositions to six, two of whom the
defendant did not depose.95
The Fifth Circuit, however, reversed the district court’s protective order,
holding that the defendant failed to make particular and specific
demonstrations of fact to warrant a protective order.96 The court reasoned
that under FRCP 26(c), the movant must show the necessity of the order by
particularized and specific facts rather than stereotyped and conclusory
statements.97 The court believed that to grant such an order would indicate
good cause “any time fact witnesses in a case are employed by the same
employer or are employed by a party in the case.”98 This conclusion would
be inconsistent with the court’s disapproval of protective orders based solely
on stereotyped and conclusory statements.99
2. Granting of Protective Orders to Exclude
On the other hand, a small number of courts have continued to grant
protective orders following the 1993 amendment.100 For instance, in Dade v.
Willis, a Pennsylvania district court granted a protective order in a police
93. Id. at 304. An explosion at an ammonium nitrate facility killed four people, injured 18 others,
and caused substantial property damage in Port Neal, Iowa. Id. An investigation committee comprised
of Terra employees and consultants reported that the explosion was caused by a faulty apparatus used
to feed nitric acid into a neutralizer, which processed liquid ammonium nitrate. Id. Terra filed suit
against Mississippi Chemical Corporation, designer of the faulty apparatus. Id. As a result, the
defendant sought a protective order sequestering all of the plaintiff’s potential fact witnesses. Id.
94. Id. at 305. See also In re Levine, 101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Dunlap v. Reading,
30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); supra notes 39, 43-46 and accompanying text (indicating these policy
concerns as “good cause” justifications for protective orders).
95. In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d at 305. See also supra notes 38, 40, 62 (addressing potential limits
on the number of corporate representatives designated in discovery proceedings).
96. In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d at 306. See also supra notes 36-57 and infra notes 122-24 and
accompanying text (establishing the standard for protective orders under FRCP 26(c)).
97. In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d at 306 (citing United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3
(5th Cir. 1978)). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035, at 483-86.
98. In re Terra Int’l, 134 F.3d at 306.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., In re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1998); Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998
WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998).
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brutality case.101 The plaintiff requested that deposition proceedings be
conducted with no one present except the deponent-party and appropriate
counsel.102 In determining whether to grant a protective order to exclude, the
court analyzed the circumstances of the parties and the issues involved.103
The Dade court held that extraordinary circumstances required sequestration
of party deponents.104 Because the claims of brutality were matters solely
within the knowledge of three individuals, credibility became a crucial
issue.105 Due to their color of authority and their opportunity to eliminate
inconsistencies, the officers’ collective presence at each other’s depositions
generated a significant risk to accurate testimony.106 The court adopted a
“more realistic and practical approach,” finding that the search for truth
required sequestration to ensure the plaintiff a fully effective day in court.107
III. ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING PROBLEM IN DEPOSITIONS
The conflicting trends in the courts and the subsequent amendment to
FRCP 30(c) in 1993 did not resolve the issue of when to exclude a corporate
101. Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *2. See also In re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1998)
(vacating denial of protective order in prisoner action, which allowed prison officials to attend
deposition proceedings of inmates).
102. Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *1. Plaintiff alleged that while being arrested at the scene of a
burglary one of the officers tripped the plaintiff, caused his pants to fall down, and dragged him to the
curb, thereby injuring his genitals,  before physically abusing him in the police car. Id.
103. Id. The well-established principle has become exclusion of a party from a deposition only
under a finding of “extraordinary circumstances.” Id. But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041
(stating that courts have the power to exclude parties, although such exclusion should be ordered
rarely); infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text (describing the appropriate showing for protective
orders).
104. Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *2. Cf. Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D.N.C.
1999) (containing egregious facts of sexual harassment by plaintiff’s supervisor, which the court held
did not constitute sufficient “good cause” to exclude).
105. Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *2. The witnesses accused of brutality were partners on the
police force and consequently possessed a great interest in the outcome of the case. Id. This
relationship substantially elevated the risk that the testimony of one would, either consciously or
subconsciously, influence the testimony of one of the others. Id. See also supra notes 47-57, 88-91 and
infra notes 132, 147, 161, 165 (emphasizing truthful and credible testimony in proceedings).
106. Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *2. But cf. In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1998);
United Incentives v. Sea Gull Lighting Prod., Inc., No. 91-0226, 1991 WL 209018 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7,
1991); Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986). See also supra notes 47-57, 88-91 and
infra note 111 (regarding conflicts over the weight given to protecting accurate testimony and the
practicability of discovery proceedings).
107. Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *3. The court further held that these circumstances required that
defendants’ common counsel be prohibited from discussing or transmitting transcripts from the
deposition testimony of one witness until the completion of both depositions, thereby preventing a
circumvention of the sequestration order. Id. at *3-4. See also infra notes 144, 161 and accompanying
text (addressing the courts’ treatment and reaction to sealing deposition transcripts and pretrial
communications).
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representative from deposition proceedings.108 Although the 1993
amendment clarified the applicable procedural regulations for addressing the
presence of potential fact witnesses, the problems still remain as to when and
to whom to exclude from discovery proceedings.109 Therefore, FRCP
26(c)(5) requires additional clarification.
The application of the 1993 amendment currently clarifies the existing
state of the discovery process.110 By requiring a court order, as opposed to a
party’s simple request to exclude, the amendment reduces the already
exorbitant amount of time and money spent in discovery, especially the cost
of depositions.111 In addition, court orders, providing this extra procedural
hurdle, impose a higher standard for exclusion of witnesses. This additional
procedural step deters frivolous complaints and conclusory allegations.112 As
a result, the current application of FRCP 30(c) increases the efficiency of the
judicial system and diminishes clutter throughout the courts.113
Moreover, some courts have further cultivated the restrictions on
deposition attendance.114 These courts proclaim that attendance at
depositions is part of a party’s fundamental right to participate in the judicial
process115 and the exclusion of parties and witnesses promotes secrecy in
judicial proceedings.116 Both the judicial system and the public disfavor such
108. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113. See also supra notes 25, 27, 31, 73 and
accompanying text (pertaining specifically to corporate representatives in deposition proceedings).
109. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(5). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(5) advisory committee’s note;
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113; supra notes 31, 73, 108 and accompanying text (addressing the
existing problem in discovery).
110. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113. See also FED. PROC. LAW. ED., supra note 22,
¶ 26:17. For a discussion of the impact of FRCP on the present discovery process, see supra notes 31,
69-72 and accompanying text.
111. See Havens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 94-1402, 1995 WL 234710 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
1995); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86 (D.N.J. 1986); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22,
§ 2035. See also supra note 18 (referring to the amount of time and money spent in discovery and
depositions).
112. See, e.g., La. Educ. Assoc. v. Richland Parish School Board, 421 F. Supp. 973 (W.D. La.
1976). Cf. supra notes 18, 111 (noting that heavier burdens deter frivolous complaints and conclusory
allegations).
113. See, e.g., In re Arbitration Between Intercarbon Beruda, Ltd. and Caltex Trading and
Transport Corp., 146 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Cf. supra notes 18, 111 (implying an increase in
judicial system efficiency).
114. See, e.g. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 96-
K-1730, 1997 WL 567923 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 1997); Tuszkiewicz v. Allen Bradley Co., 170 F.R.D. 15
(E.D. Wisc. 1996); Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986).
115. See Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 96-K-1730, 1997 WL 567923 (D. Colo. Aug. 18,
1997); Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986) (invoking orders sparingly to preserve
openness and procedural fairness within the legal system).
116. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Marcus, supra note 21; supra notes 21, 61, 76,
89 and accompanying text.
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secrecy and limited access.117 Therefore, by providing a court order for the
exclusion of parties and witnesses, the judicial system can oversee and
protect open adjudicatory proceedings even during discovery.118
Despite strengthening the discovery process, the 1993 amendment to
FRCP 30(c) has also generated problems. Although the amendment clarified
the confusion of the courts over the governing rules of depositions by
specifying the appropriate procedural rules,119 it failed to provide guidance as
to the substantive requirement for exclusion.120 The amendment simply
directs exclusionary issues at depositions to FRCP 26(c)(5). Courts have,
therefore, proceeded to freely interpret the application of FRCP 26(c)(5)’s
requirements to corporate representatives and potential fact witnesses
attending deposition proceedings, preventing uniformity and predictability in
the federal court system.121
The practical consequences of the 1993 amendment contradict its
intended purposes. Certain courts have specifically interpreted the
amendment to mean that pursuant to FRCP 26(c)(5), potential deponents
may observe other depositions, absent an extraordinary or compelling
standard for exclusion.122 Other courts now require particular and specific
demonstrations of fact under FRCP 26(c)(5) for exclusion, not stereotyped or
conclusory statements of prejudice or potential harm.123 Consequently, courts
have taken the “good cause” standard set forth in FCRP 26(c)(5) and
transformed it into an “extraordinary or compelling” threshold for excluding
a witness or party at depositions.124 In the process, courts have increasingly
117. See supra note 116. But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041 (stating that in reality
discovery is closed and the public has no right to attend proceedings); Miller, supra note 23, at 450.
118. See supra note 116.
119. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note. For a discussion on the 1993
amendment, see Part II.C.
120. For a discussion of the advisory committee’s note to the 1993 amendment, see supra note 66
and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,
185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Williams v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., No. 98-2931, 1999 WL 221119
(E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1999); Nyazie v. Kennedy, No. 97-0120, 1998 WL 398250 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998);
Lee v. Denver Sheriff’s Dep’t, 181 F.R.D. 651 (D. Colo. 1998); Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No.
96-K-1730, 1997 WL 567923 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 1997); Tuszkiewicz v. Allen Bradley Co., 170
F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wisc. 1996).
122. See, e.g., In re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1997); Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998
WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035.
123. See, e.g., In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc.,
185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Williams v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., No. 98-2931, 1999 WL 221119
(E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1999). See also supra notes 82, 85.
124. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136
F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); In re Levine, 101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo,
Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D.
154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999); Naismith
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allowed the use of corporate representatives to achieve tactical results,
whether to sharpen consistencies in testimony or to influence the deponent.125
The use of corporate representatives and potential fact witnesses as a
tactical means to an end poses significant threats given the current
importance of discovery and pretrial proceedings.126 Depositions increasingly
serve as a critical and essential mechanism in civil and sometimes criminal
disputes.127 Although not the equivalent of trials, depositions are a key stage
in lawsuits.128 Often the strength of facts and testimony elicited at depositions
determine settlements and the expediency of trials.129 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court’s approval of summary judgments as a means to resolve
disputes also impacts the discovery process.130 Consequently, the interests of
justice mandate eliciting accurate, reliable, and full disclosure of facts and
information through deposition proceedings.
Pretrial proceedings, such as depositions, are designed to discover facts
and issues.131 Under the current law, however, parties at depositions often
taint facts and tailor them in certain situations. For instance, a fact witness
may be reluctant to elaborate fully a set of events for fear of the parties in
attendance.132 Moreover, the parties present may alter the truth later, as
deponents themselves, in order to contradict the prior deponent.133 At trial,
v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apartment Rentals, 79
F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962). But see, e.g.,
supra note 121.
125. See supra note 121.
126. See Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); In re Levine, 101 B.R. 260
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041. For a discussion of the importance of
discovery in legal settings and the threat posed to discovery and other litigation processes by allowing
fact witnesses to attend depositions as part of a party’s strategy, see supra notes 15-19, 21 and
accompanying text.
127. See Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 96-K-1730, 1997 WL 567923 (D. Colo. Aug. 18,
1997). For a discussion of the importance of depositions in pretrial and judicial proceedings, see supra
notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
128. See supra text accompanying note 17 (noting that depositions are a key stage in lawsuits even
though not the equivalent of trial). See also Visor, 1997 WL 567923, at *2 & n.2; WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 22, § 2041.
129. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text
(indicating that facts elicited during depositions determine settlements and scope of trial).
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 18 (revealing that
summary judgments have an increased impact on the discovery process). See also Visor, 1997 WL
567923, at *2 & n.2.
131. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507-08 (stating the purposes of pretrial proceedings).
132. See Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998 WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998); In re Levine,
101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041; supra notes 47-57, 88-91.
133. See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); Beacon Jones Apartment
Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio 1978). For a discussion of a witness’s potential to contradict or
alter the truth, see supra notes 46, 57, 63 and accompanying text.
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protection mechanisms exist to eliminate such undesirable circumstances and
exclude potentially harmful parties from attendance.134 Under current law,
however, these protection mechanisms are severely limited in pretrial
proceedings.135
Opponents of witness exclusion argue that the skill and competence of
attorneys on cross-examination sufficiently overcomes these limited
mechanisms to protect the accuracy and openness of testimony at
depositions.136 However, cross-examination may not always alleviate these
problems. For example, a summary judgment motion may never reach the
cross-examination stage at trial.137 Furthermore, FRE may limit the use of
extrinsic evidence to impeach or attack the credibility of certain fact
witnesses.138 Relying on the skill of attorneys in situations where their hands
are tied does not sufficiently protect and ensure truth and fairness in judicial
proceedings.
Corporate representatives serve a vital function in the litigation process.139
Pursuant to state law, corporations are considered self-existing entities.140 As
a result, a corporation has a presumptive right to participate in pretrial
depositions and proceedings, just like an individual party.141 Because the
interests of time and money necessitate expediency in pretrial and trial
proceedings, the use of corporate representatives as deponents makes
sense.142 Supervisors or other fact witnesses, as well as others within the
corporation’s chain-of-command, often have the most knowledge about the
particular issue underlying the lawsuit. Moreover, many times, these
depositions occur at different locations across the country and it is more
logical for the parties to take advantage of the individuals from a
134. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 615.
135. See Visor, 1997 WL 567923, at *2 n.2.
136. Id. at *3 (stating that the skill and competence of attorneys is sufficient to both overcome
deficiencies in testimony and discover facts).
137. Cf. supra text accompanying note 18. See also Visor, 1997 WL 567923, at *2 & n.2.
138. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 607, 608, 613. See also supra notes 44, 134 and accompanying text
(indicating the evidentiary differences between trial and discovery).
139. See Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23,
§ 145. See also supra notes 31, 38, 57 and accompanying text (emphasizing corporate representatives’
vital function in discovery).
140. See AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23, § 145; supra note 31 and accompanying text (recognizing
corporations as separate entities).
141. See WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 1841. For a discussion of a corporation’s presumptive right
like any other party to attend depositions, see supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
142. See Havens v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., No. 94-1042, 1995 WL 234710 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20,
1995); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 113 F.R.D. 86 (D.N.J. 1986). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
22, § 2035; supra notes 18, 111 and accompanying text (referring to the amount of time and money
spent in discovery and depositions).
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corporation’s regional branch.143 Finally, especially considering the courts’
unwillingness to seal deposition transcripts and pretrial proceedings,144 the
ability of corporate representatives or witnesses to read prior deposition
transcripts circumvents FRCP 26(c)(5), defeating the purpose for seeking
exclusion.
IV. PROPOSAL
The issue unresolved before the courts concerns whether, and when, to
exclude potential fact witnesses, namely corporate representatives, from
deposition proceedings.145 The 1993 amendment clarified that FRCP 26(c)(5)
governed these proceedings and that potential witnesses were not
automatically excluded from such discovery.146 Therefore, a proposal to
clarify the current situation must meet two competing objectives: (1)
protecting the interests of parties to the litigation and (2) preserving the
corporate representative power.
The first objective seeks to protect the interests of parties to the litigation
by ensuring a fair and expedient resolution of the conflict. This goal includes
the acquisition of full and accurate testimony and facts without fear or
intimidation.147 The second objective must preserve the corporate
representative power in judicial proceedings.148 This power includes
attendance at pretrial depositions as well as trial proceedings, as secured by
FRE 615.149 However, this power requires modification at times in order to
143. The FRCP allow such individuals to act as representatives for the corporation. See Lumpkin
v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23, § 145. See also supra
notes 31, 38, 57, 139 and accompanying text (emphasizing corporate representatives’ vital function in
discovery).
144. In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998
WL 260270, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112
F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999).
But see Naismith v. Prof’l Golfer’s Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
25, § 2113, at 92 n.10.
145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note. See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25,
§ 2113. For a discussion of the unresolved issue before the courts as to when potential fact witnesses
may be excluded, see supra notes 31, 66, 73, 108-09 and accompanying text.
146. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note. See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22,
§ 2014; FED. PROC. LAW. ED., supra note 22, § 26:218.
147. See Dade v. Willis, 1998 WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. 1998); In re Levine, 101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1989); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22,
§ 2041; supra notes 18, 47-57, 61, 88-91 and text accompanying note 132.
148. See Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23,
§ 145. See also supra notes 31, 38, 57, 139 and accompanying text (emphasizing corporate
representatives’ vital function in discovery).
149. See FED. R. EVID. 615. For discussion of FRE 615 and the power of representatives and
parties to attend trial proceedings, see supra notes 7, 8 and accompanying text.
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protect witnesses and parties in certain situations.150
The proposal that best achieves these objectives is an amendment to
FRCP 26(c)(5). This amendment would simply add the phrase “to ensure the
integrity of the proceeding”151 as a ground for which “good cause” must be
shown to obtain a protective order.152 By adding an additional ground of
integrity, the amendment would supplement the existing bases of
“annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or undue burden or expense.”153
Specifically, FRCP 26(c)(5) should be amended to read as follows:
Upon a motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, . . . the court in the district where the deposition is to be taken
may make any order which justice requires to protect a party or person
from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, . . . undue burden or
expense, or to ensure the integrity of the proceeding, including one or
more of the following . . . .154
Due to the absence of a similar integrity basis, courts have failed to
exclude witnesses in certain situations where accurate testimony or
truthfulness was a realistic concern.155 These courts indicated that the
grounds of “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense” do not contain such a basis. By expanding the grounds for courts to
monitor the fairness of discovery, deposition proceedings can better protect
the interests of the parties.
150. See, e.g., In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991) (requiring representatives
to sit outside deposition and consult with attorneys during breaks).
151. Under this proposal, “integrity” would be defined according to the existing meaning
associated with the term in each particular jurisdiction. In essence, the definition includes a soundness
or ethical principle, as well as character in dealing with others. In addition, this term incorporates
honesty and fidelity. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (6th ed. 1990).
152. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). See also In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991);
In re Levine, 101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga.
1987); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub
nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999); Naismith v. Prof’l Golfers Ass’n, 85
F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Beacon v. R.M. Jones Apartment Rentals, 79 F.R.D. 141 (N.D. Ohio
1978); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129. But see In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir.
1998); Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D.N.C. 1999); Williams v. Chrysler Fin.
Corp., No. 98-2931, 1999 WL 221119 (E.D. La. Apr. 9, 1999); Nyazie v. Kennedy, No. 97-0120, 1998
WL 398250 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1998); Lee v. Denver Sheriff’s Dep’t, 181 F.R.D. 651 (D. Colo. 1998);
Visor v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., No. 96-K-1730, 1997 WL 567923 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 1997);
Tuszkiewicz v. Allen Bradley Co., 170 F.R.D. 15 (E.D. Wisc. 1996); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986
(2d Cir. 1973).
153. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). See also supra note 10 and accompanying text (citing FRCP 26(c) and
the grounds for the issuance of other protective orders).
154. Italicized words represent new language added to existing portions of FRCP 26(c).
155. See Visor, 1997 WL 567923, at *3 (stating that concerns of influencing or tainting
deponent’s testimony fall outside the FRCP 26(c) grounds for protective orders).
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This amendment to FRCP 26(c)(5) also sends a message to courts. By
emphasizing the importance of integrity in pretrial proceedings, courts would
be forced to assess the need for accuracy, fairness, and truth even in
depositions.156 This emphasis should also assist in reinforcing the “good
cause” standard for obtaining a protective order,157 instead of the higher
“extraordinary or compelling” threshold of review that courts have used to
apply this standard.158
Aside from emphasizing the integrity concern, this proposal also requires
an additional component, namely an advisory committee note. This note
would detail the purpose behind the rule and its intended application. In
addition, this note would instruct the courts to properly interpret discovery
procedure, highlighting the “good cause” standard set forth in the rule.159
Although not mandatory, this advisory note would direct courts away from
the high judicial threshold. Further, this note would promote the preservation
of corporate representatives in depositions160 while emphasizing the
importance of a careful consideration of the qualifications of the individuals
acting on the corporation’s behalf. While failing to seal prior deposition
transcripts may appear to circumvent FRCP 26(c)(5), this proposal alleviates
the dangers of intimidation and immediate fabrication in depositions.161
Moreover, with these changes, courts should be more willing to seal
transcripts in certain situations.162
This proposal satisfies the two primary objectives detailed above. First,
the proposal protects the interests of the parties to the litigation. The
amendment empowers courts to grant protective orders to ensure the integrity
156. See Solar Turbines, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 551, 553 (1988). See also supra note 46.
157. For a discussion of the original “good cause” standard for granting a protective order, see
supra notes 39, 122-24 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 85, 122-24 and accompanying text (covering the transformation of the proper
standard for granting protective orders).
159. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). See supra notes 39, 122-24, 157-58 and accompanying text (referring
to the “good cause” and proper standard discussions).
160. See Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23,
§ 145. See also supra notes 31, 38, 57, 139, 143 and accompanying text (emphasizing corporate
representatives’ vital function in discovery).
161. See Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998 WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998); In re Levine,
101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041; supra notes 47-57, 88-91, 132, 147. See also In re Shell Oil Refinery,
136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154
(N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing the
courts’ unwillingness to restrict transcripts and communications between depositions and trial).
162. See In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); Dade, 1998 WL 260270, at *3;
BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v. Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom.
BCI Comm. v. Boeing, 995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999). But see Naismith v. Prof’l Golfer’s Ass’n, 85
F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 25, § 2113,  at 92 n.10.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol78/iss4/6
1521 Heribson.doc 04/24/01   5:04 PM
2000] CORPORATE REPS IN DEPS 1547
of deposition proceedings. This new basis, combined with the advisory
committee note emphasizing the “good cause” standard, allows courts the
freedom to preserve accurate, full, and fair testimony.163
Second, the proposal preserves the corporate representative power in
pretrial proceedings. The advisory committee note reaffirms the significance
of having a representative present during judicial proceedings.164 However,
the impact of a particular individual attending judicial proceedings on behalf
of the corporation factors into the court’s decision.165 The time and cost of
depositions influence the selection of representatives. With these factors in
mind, courts can assess the circumstances and ensure the integrity of the
proceedings while simultaneously permitting effective corporate
representation.
V. CONCLUSION
Prior to 1993, courts experienced confusion as to the federal rules
governing the attendance of corporate representatives and potential fact
witnesses at discovery proceedings.166 As a result, courts generally favored
excluding persons from depositions, whether parties or potential witnesses.
In 1993, however, an amendment to FRCP 30(c) expressly prohibited the
application of FRE 615 to depositions.167 Consequently, courts may only
grant a protective order excluding individuals from depositions if the party
163. See Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998 WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998); In re Levine,
101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041; supra notes 18, 47-57, 61, 88-91, 132, 147.
164. See Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 23,
§ 145. See also supra notes 31, 38, 57, 139, 148 and accompanying text (emphasizing corporate
representatives’ vital function in discovery).
165. See Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869, 1998 WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998); In re Levine,
101 B.R. 260 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989); Dunlap v. Reading Co., 30 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1962); WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 22, § 2041; supra notes 47-57, 88-91, 132. Cf. Havens v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., No. 94-1042, 1995 WL 234710 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1995); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 113.
F.R.D. 86 (D.N.J. 1986); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035. See also supra note 18 and 111
(referring to the amount of time and money spent in discovery and depositions).
166. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 451 (M.D. Ga. 1987); Naismith v. Prof’l
Golfers Ass’n, 85 F.R.D. 552 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Williams v. Elec. Control Sys., Inc., 68 F.R.D. 703
(E.D. Tenn. 1975) (applying FRE 615 to deposition proceedings). But cf. Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d
986 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Shell Oil Refinery, 136 F.R.D. 615 (E.D. La. 1991); BCI Comm. Sys., Inc. v.
Bell Atlanticom Sys., Inc., 112 F.R.D. 154 (N.D. Ala. 1986), aff’d sub nom. BCI Comm. v. Boeing,
995 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1999); Kerschbaumer v. Bell, 112 F.R.D. 426 (D.D.C. 1986); Skidmore v.
Northwest Eng’g Co., 90 F.R.D. 75 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (applying FRCP 26 to deposition proceedings).
167. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) advisory committee’s note; WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 25, § 2113. See also FED. PROC. LAW. ED., supra note 22, § 26:17; supra notes 31, 110 and
accompanying text (referring to 1993 amendment). For a thorough discussion of the 1993 amendment,
see Part II.C.
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moving for the order shows “good cause” as required under FRCP 26(c)(5).
Currently, absent extraordinary or compelling circumstances, corporate
representatives are allowed to alternate even though they may be potential
witnesses or possess supervisory authority.168
Due to the current state of the law, an amendment to FRCP 26(c)(5)
should supplement the protection of integrity in discovery proceedings.
Combined with an advisory committee note expressing the intended purpose
and application, the amendment would best protect the interests of parties to
the litigation as well as preserve the corporate representative power in
judicial proceedings. Consequently, the proposed amendment would enhance
the vital role of discovery in the adjudicatory process.
James F. Herbison*
168. See, e.g., Williams v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., No. 98-2931, 1999 WL 221119 (E.D. La. Apr. 9,
1999); In re Wilkinson, 137 F.3d 911 (6th Cir. 1997); In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302 (5th Cir.
1998); Jones v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 223 (M.D. N.C. 1999); Dade v. Willis, No. 95-6869,
1998 WL 260270 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 1998). See also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 22, § 2035; supra
notes 82, 86, 122-23.
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